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Abstract 
 
 
The scramble for Africa’s natural resources has never been more prominent. Rather 
than contributing to development through means of mineral rents, countries such as 
Malawi appear to be suffering as a result of increased investment from multinational 
mining corporations. Also known as the resource curse, Malawi’s high natural 
resource endowment is hurting its citizens, rather than benefitting them. While the 
majority of studies within the resource curse thesis focus on the adverse effects on a 
national scale, this paper is centered on a natural resource curse in a local context, 
where mining has its most immediate and largest impact.  This study is based on 
qualitative field research in the capital, Lilongwe, and in the rural mining town of 
Karonga in Malawi. My findings have indicated that symptoms of the resource curse 
go beyond national and economic indicators. As a result of mining, the resource curse 
in Karonga has translated to livelihoods being compromised due to: displacement and 
resettlement, employment by mining companies, corruption; and unfulfilled promises 
of new schools, hospitals, and amenities such as running water and electricity. In 
addition to communities, mining firms have shown little concern for the environment 
and the spread of toxic waste. The overall lack of transparency and accountability by 
mining companies and government have shown to be the main contributors to a 
resource curse in Karonga.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The 21st century has sparked a new wave in the scramble for Africa’s minerals and 
mining investors are no longer predominantly Western. Countries such as China have 
also entered the scene due to their rising economic levels and their shift from export-
led manufacturing towards internal consumption (Harvey 2014). Despite Africa’s 
abundance of rich minerals and increased levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), 
the generating of linkages between natural resource endowment and development 
appears to be no easy task. “Africa is a rich continent, because of the abundance of 
natural resources it contains; Africa is a poor continent, because the vast number of its 
population remains in poverty” (Grant et al. 2012).  
 
Until recently the mining sector in Malawi has contributed relatively little to the 
economy and Malawi was not recognized as a mining country, unlike its neighbors 
Tanzania with large reserves of gold, and Zambia, a major producer of copper. 
Nonetheless, in the last decade, mining has taken off in Malawi with several foreign 
companies, mainly from the United Kingdom, Australia, Portugal and China actively 
exploring amidst expanding global demand for natural resources to feed their 
developed or emerging economies.  
 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. The worldwide anti-smoking 
campaign has translated to a decrease in tobacco sales, Malawi’s largest export crop. 
Therefore, the country is dire need to expand to other sectors of the economy. To 
express their commitment to economic growth and development, the Malawian 
government has named mining a priority sector in the Growth and Development 
Strategy II 2012-2016 and the Economic Recovery Plan.  
 
While developing the extractives sector could translate to an abundance of much-
needed economic development for Malawi, there appears to be a paradoxical 
relationship in which the country’s high natural resource endowment seems to be 
hurting Malawian citizens, rather than benefitting them. It is recognized however, that 
this puzzling juxtaposition is no new phenomenon. Dating back to the 17th century for 
example, the pouring of gold and silver into Spain from their colonies still left the 
country with a weak economy, compared to resource-poor Netherlands (Duruigbo 
2005). Today, countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, and Angola suffer from the same predicament.  
 
This paper argues that Malawi is suffering from symptoms of a resource curse. Rather 
than focusing on Malawi’s resource curse on a national scale, the focus of this study 
is on how mining is affecting Malawi on a local level - a subject rarely discussed in 
the general resource curse literature. This will be achieved by contributing to a more 
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collaborative study of the natural resource curse thesis and to show how the impacts 
of mining go beyond national and economic indicators.  
 
 
1.2 Aim and Significance 
 
Studies have shown that mineral extraction is one of the most socially and 
environmentally disruptive activities (Bebbington et al. 2008). As a result of the 
current and increasing interest in Africa’s natural resources, it is urgent to explore the 
impact that mineral extraction is having on its host countries. A dominating debate in 
the resource curse thesis is the relationship between development and economic 
growth on a national scale, yet the local effects, where resource extraction has its 
immediate and largest impact, are seldom explored. 
 
A majority of existing studies on the micro level resource curse are dominated with a 
large anthropological focus (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015). Despite these studies 
providing valuable information on the subject at hand, there is a need to compliment 
these findings with those in the field of political science in order to influence the 
formation of better and more responsible social and environmental policies in 
extractive industries. In order to contribute to this, this qualitative research intends to 
fill in the gap of the resource curse thesis by providing a case study of Malawi’s 
mining sector and the effects on local residents. Therefore, the research question is as 
follows. 
 
 
1.2.1 Research Question 
 
v What are the effects of a resource curse on Malawi’s local mining 
communities? 
 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
 
Although the role of institutions and mining corporations are heavily involved in the 
resource curse theory, I have conducted few interviews with civil servants and no 
interviews with mining corporations. This was a conscientious decision, as I wanted 
to conduct this research from the perspective of civil society; and in order to find out 
about the local effects of a resource curse, I was obliged to interact with local mining 
communities. 
 
Furthermore, it was acknowledged that sensitive issues such as corruption and lack of 
good governance were more easily discussed with members of civil society 
organizations (CSOs), media and academia, rather than with members of the civil 
service. This was observed first-hand during an interview I conducted with the Senior 
Chief of Karonga and will be discussed in the empirical analysis of this paper.  
 
 
1.4 Outline of Study 
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The following chapter will discuss the methodology of this research and a reflection 
of the ethical considerations during my fieldwork in Malawi. Chapter three is 
comprised of a literature review, discussing existing empirical studies on the resource 
curse in its local context. In chapter four, the theoretical framework will be presented 
with a broader focus on the resource curse. Chapter five will encompass an empirical 
analysis of my findings in Malawi, with continuous reference to the selected theory 
and its local implications. The final chapter will summarize the findings and provide a 
conclusion of the study. 
 
 
2. Methods 
 
This research is structured in the form of a case study, as it was essential for me as a 
researcher to explore the interplay between all variables and provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the issue at hand. Furthermore, due to my particular research 
question, it was necessary for me to undertake this research in its naturalistic setting 
in order to obtain thorough material about the perspectives of people and communities 
in the mining areas and the situation in which they find themselves. Therefore, this 
research is also ungeneralizable.  
 
The specific type of case study is in between an illustrative and critical case study, as 
the goal is to equip readers with a better understanding of the resource curse in its 
local context. The aim is to also compliment the mainstream resource curse thesis that 
rarely sets focus on the local impacts of mineral extraction. As the research is 
qualitative in nature, this study can be considered as more ‘credible and confirmable, 
rather than valid and reliable’ (Merriam 1985).  
 
  
2.1 Research Design 
 
Funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), I 
conducted a minor field study (MFS) in Malawi on the 10th of January 2015 for a total 
of 8 weeks. Research was first carried out in the capital, Lilongwe, where I met with 
various CSOs that provided information on the local and national effects of mining in 
Malawi. The information obtained by informants was then put into perspective during 
my visit to the rural town of Karonga when I visited two mines and met with local 
communities.  
 
A qualitative approach was chosen due to the nature of the research being exploratory 
and my intent to ‘understand the social world through an examination of the 
interpretation of that world by participants’ (Bryman 2008: 365). During my 
engagement with the interviewees, I was determined collect material through 
meaningful interaction, rather than merely treating them as respondents to research 
instruments (Bryman 2008: 26). This is especially true for the mining communities 
who provided detailed accounts of their lives prior and post-mining operations, as 
well as the experiences of their families and neighbors.  
 
 
2.2 Data Collection 
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2.2.1 Selection of Case and Sampling 
 
The case study of Malawi was chosen due to the country’s relatively infant mining 
sector and the current heightened interests in exploiting its natural resources. 
Furthermore, another, more personal reason for choosing Malawi is due to my 
existing cultural sensitivity that was developed during my childhood years spent in 
Malawi. It seemed advantageous to conduct research in a country I was familiar with 
and “attentive to histories of colonialism, development, globalization and local 
realities in order to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of domination and 
control” (Sultana 2007). Nevertheless, I cannot claim that there were no ethical 
dilemmas that surfaced; however, they will be discussed in section 2.4. 
In order to learn more about the relationship between mining and development in 
Malawi, I decided to base the majority of this research on interviews with civil 
society. The advocacy work of civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Citizens for Justice (CFJ) and Norwegian 
Church Aid (NCA) assisted me in identifying some of the most pressing challenges 
associated with Malawi’s mining sector. In turn, many of these challenges were 
observed first-hand during my engagement with communities in Karonga whom 
reside around the mining sites. I was provided an insight into how their livelihoods 
have been affected from mining activity, the relationship that communities have with 
mining investors, and how government has responded to the adverse effects 
associated with mining. Other members of civil society, including academics, were 
also interviewed to gain perspectives on the investment environment of Malawi. Key 
themes that were discussed include politics, corruption, and lack of transparency and 
accountability. 
Civil servant participants such as the Senior Mining Engineer from the Ministry of 
Mines provided a governmental perspective on mining in Malawi and equipped me 
with information regarding the formalities of the mining-license application 
procedure, the legislation that governs mining, and the relationship of government 
with civil society and mining investors. An interview was also conducted with the 
Senior Chief of Karonga who is a local authority in Karonga and employed by the 
Malawian government.  
 
2.2.2 Interviews 
 
To carry out my qualitative research, eleven semi-structured and unstructured 
interviews were employed in order to obtain in-depth information and learn about the 
perceptions of my participants in a way that does not limit the field of inquiry. Not 
only did these interviewing methods suit my particular research question, but it also 
allowed me to minimize the status differences with the participants, thus creating an 
environment of openness and trust, and contributing to richer data (Punch 2005: 173).  
 
A focus group was used with eight members of a community that reside around the 
Mwabulambo coal mine. I was able to facilitate the discussion by asking general, 
open-ended questions and allowing the participants to answer freely and build upon 
each other’s responses. The use of a group interview proved to be an attractive data-
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collecting method as it stimulated people in making ‘explicit their views, perceptions, 
motives, and reasons’ (Punch 2005: 171) that otherwise wouldn’t be possible in an 
individual interview setting.  
 
Two individual interviews and the group interview with community members in 
Karonga required a translator. The responses were documented manually in my 
notebook during the data collection process and the remaining interviews were 
digitally recorded. All of the material was transcribed on my laptop following the 
interviews. 
 
 
2.2.3 Observations 
 
Data was also collected through means of participant observation. I attended two 
meetings in Malawi - one in Lilongwe and one in Karonga. The first meeting was an 
assembly of members of government, civil society and media where CSOs discussed 
concerns and recommendations for Malawi’s mining legislation that is currently in its 
drafting phase. The themes of this meeting included the shortfalls of current mining 
policies, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), safety health and social welfare, 
environmental management and human resources development.  
 
The second meeting (in Karonga) was also organized by CSOs, and was intended to 
spread awareness to local communities about the health hazards associated with 
mining and to provide information on the results of radiation testing on the mining 
sites and surrounding villages. As Malawi lacks the expertise in this area, a nuclear 
physics engineer from the Commission for Independent Research and Information on 
Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) in France was invited to conduct the testing and participate 
in the discussion with community members on his findings. 
 
 
2.2.4 Reports 
 
Following the interviews with members of CSOs, I was given various reports and 
studies by them regarding the adverse effects of mining in Malawi and their lobbying 
efforts in relation to the governance of mining. Examples of these recommendations 
include increased transparency and the mainstreaming of environmental and social 
safeguards in Malawi’s mining sector. The reports provided by the CSOs 
complemented the existing material, as it entails descriptive information that would 
have been difficult to cover during the interviews due to limited time. Furthermore, it 
helped to answer questions that I had not thought of during my field study in Malawi, 
and mutually accounted for any shortage of information given by the informants. 
 
 
2.3 Data Analysis 
 
This research has employed an inductive approach, in which observations generated 
patterns, and patterns pointed towards a suitable theory. In contrast to deductive 
research, I chose not to limit my findings through categorization of the data, and 
instead chose to be more sensitive of the responses and observations of the 
participants. This allowed me to be more open and focused on exploring new 
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phenomena, rather than narrowing the scope of study. Themes were identifiable 
during the data collection process, thus influencing the choice of theory following the 
data analysis.  
 
 
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
 
Returning to Malawi to conduct research rather than visiting one of the places I once 
called ‘home’ has insofar proven to have its positive and negative aspects. Despite my 
feelings of having strong linkages with the country, I needed to remind myself to 
refrain from feeling too comfortable and confident in this familiar setting in order to 
avoid being ignorant of possible ethical concerns that may arise during the research 
process. Similar to the account of Sultana and her experience of returning ‘home’ to 
Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork, I felt my positionality and identity on the field as 
being in the ‘in-between status’ of simultaneously being an insider, outsider, both and 
neither (Gilbert 1994 and Mullings 1999, cited in Sultana 2007). I noticed a 
difference, although small, in how I was treated once I had mentioned that my mother 
was Malawian and I had spent some of my childhood in Malawi. I wasn’t just another 
mzungu (white person) coming to Malawi to collect data and then leave for good. One 
of the informants went as far as to call me his ‘African sister’ and seemed to have felt 
more open and comfortable in the interview following our introduction and minor 
moment of ‘bonding.’ I felt that the closeness that was established, however small in 
this particular interview, enriched the data as it somehow ‘bridged our differences and 
fostered mutual interest in the interviewing process’ (Miraftab 2007).  
In addition to the power relations associated with being a researcher and the ability to 
‘name categories, control information about the research agenda, define interventions 
and come and go as a research scientist’ (Staeheli and Lawson 1995: 332, cited in 
Rose 1997), I had to be mindful of the social and economic differences between the 
participants and myself, predominantly during my visits with the mining 
communities. I attempted to appease these discrepancies by stating that I am a student 
and the focus of my research was for me to learn from them. Furthermore, I did not 
bring any expensive devices, such as my laptop, and instead decided to take notes 
using a pen and paper. As it is difficult to determine how my interactions with 
community members would have been different had I not taken the aforementioned 
measures, I feel confident that it better showed my respect and helped to make them 
feel comfortable during the interviewing process.   
 
3 Literature Review 
 
This section is intended to shed light on existing literature that explores the 
relationship between natural resources and development. Literature on the general 
resource curse thesis was also used for this research, however, as it is covered in the 
theoretical framework of this paper, it will be more elaborated upon in the next 
chapter. In the meantime, this section is dedicated to discussing the few cases in 
which the effects of the resource curse are examined at a micro level. 
 
 
3.1 The Resource Curse on a Local Scale 
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The macro level impacts of natural resource endowment on development have been 
widely investigated by social scientists and economists, yet its local impacts have 
rarely been explored. In regards to the few cases in which it has been discussed, the 
empirical work (mostly anthropological) generally holds that the “very basic level of 
cultural difference (based on conflicting and incompatible social, political and 
economic forms of organization) creates very basic human problems - conflict, social 
fragmentation and dislocation, poverty and inequality. Indigenous (or ‘non Western’) 
populations with non-market, transitional or recently hybridized economic systems of 
organization accommodate the peculiarities associated with mineral extraction in line 
with their own social, economic and political idioms” (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 
2015). Drawing from the aforementioned themes by authors and the existing 
literature, the following sections will explore the resource curse in its local context 
and focus on conflict, inequality, and the role of local government and mining 
companies. 
 
 
3.1.1 Conflict 
 
When focusing on the resource curse at a micro level, much of the existing empirical 
work agrees that a major consequence is the creation of conflict (Aguilar-Støen and 
Hirsch 2014; Revesz and Diez 2006; Arellano-Yanguas 2006). Furthermore, in places 
where conflict already exists, authors argue that mining activity perpetuates conflict 
(Billings 2015, 1998; Elmslie 2002; Kirksey 2012).  
 
The sensitive and detrimental colonial relationship with Indonesia and the resistance 
built by local communities of West Papua were further penetrated with the 
commencement of mining and the search for wealth and land by Indonesia in efforts 
to support their expanding population (Billings 2015). Indigenous communities in 
West Papua essentially had their ‘lands stolen for other peoples’ development 
projects,’ therefore making them vulnerable to oppression and dispossession (ibid). 
The protests for independence have led to torture, assassinations and widespread 
discrimination of local populations in West Papua (Kirksey 2012; Billings 2015).  
 
Without addressing prior and current issues associated with colonization, the 
introduction of mining activity essentially added fuel to the fire. In the case of West 
Papua, perhaps the indigenous populations would have achieved their independence 
and not endured such hardships had mining not commenced on their lands and 
attracted the likes of Indonesia.  
 
In other cases, authors have also shown that mining can cause conflict within the local 
indigenous communities, such as the proliferation of pro-mining and anti-mining 
groups (Lusterio-Rico 2013). The disparity in perceptions is related to the impact that 
mining has had on livelihoods. For example, in the case of mining in Rapu-Rapu in 
the Philippines, community residents that relied on fish as a source of food and 
income were more adversely affected as a result of toxic waste in the water due to the 
mine; while others (who did not rely on fishing) were pro-mining due to the benefits 
of employment and scholarships provided by mining companies (ibid). The following 
section also correlates with this argument.  
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3.1.2 Inequality  
 
In addition to conflict, studies show that ‘resource wealth may increase income 
inequality in divided societies’ (Bhattacharya 2012). Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012) 
have found that when social factors, such as kinship, socio-political exchange, 
migration and land tenure are not taken into consideration, the implementation of 
CSR policies by mining companies can actually be detrimental as a result of long-
standing socio-cultural constructs.  
 
This is pertinent in Szablowski’s (2002) illustration of the impact of copper mining on 
local communities in the remote district of Andean Peru. The sensitive and complex 
ethnic structures between the campesino (peasant) ethnic group, and the mestizo (who 
are mixed with Spanish blood) led to the varying degrees of benefits from mining 
activity as the mestizo were the predominant landholders in the mining area and also 
held more formal positions of employment (ibid). 
 
According to Szablowski (2002), the few campesino landholders that were 
compensated for their pastoral land were reported to ‘losing their resettlement land 
and money received by the mining company after only two years, most likely due to 
their inexperience of handling large sums of money and the limited knowledge and 
opportunities for investment.’ Essentially, the lands they once used for agriculture and 
livestock were commodified, however, as they are a non-capitalist society, its not as 
simple as restoring their livelihoods with money.  
 
While some transnational mining companies actually have good intentions and strive 
for a ‘social license’ to operate, their actions on ways to achieve this are based on 
Western ideals, and have thus proven to have ominous consequences for indigenous 
populations in the Global South. It is therefore crucial for mining corporations to 
understand the cultural and social constructs in the areas of operation prior to 
implementing their CSR policies. 
 
 
3.1.3 Surviving the Local Resource Curse 
 
In terms of surviving the bouts of conflict and increased inequality associated with the  
resource curse on a local scale, Zeng and Zhan (2015) hold that it can be overcome 
through means of redistribution of resource wealth by local government. Drawing 
from their empirical case study of coal-rich Chinese locality, Zeng and Zhan (2015) 
claim that the locality was able to overcome a resource curse by: ‘the local state 
providing their citizens with an attractive economic package in the event of 
relocation; increasing social welfare of residents - e.g. enhanced coverage of medical 
insurance; and by creating employment opportunities.’  
 
It is important to recognize, however, that in relation to a local resource curse in the 
case study of Zeng and Zhan (2015), the role of local state actors and their 
redistribution policies do not suffice to surviving a local resource curse. While it 
might ease some situations involving inequality and conflict, studies show that often 
the actions of corporations, specifically environmental degradation associated with 
mining, have been a cause of conflict (Billings 2015). As the role of the state is 
important in the survival of a local resource curse, the role of mining firms are equally 
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important in terms of controlling the adverse effects of mining on the environment 
and being socially and environmentally accountable.  
 
 
3.1.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Based on the aforementioned literature, the study of the resource curse on a micro 
scale is predominantly conducted within the field of anthropology, perhaps with 
exception of the last case study of Zeng and Zhan (2015) that concentrates on the 
nature of local institutions in relation to overcoming the adverse effects of mining. 
Notwithstanding, the anthropological focus on the resource curse greatly compliments 
the more general resource curse thesis and there is a need for these findings to be 
mainstreamed. With the involvement of researchers from other fields, such as political 
science and economics, I believe that the possibility of creating more socially and 
environmentally responsible policies within the extractive industry could improve. 
 
 
4 Theory 
 
4.1 The ‘Resource Curse’  
 
A term coined by Richard Auty (1993), the ‘resource curse’ is a theory that describes 
the paradoxical outcome of natural resources being a curse, rather than a blessing. It 
holds that resource-rich countries tend to perform relatively poorly on overall 
economic growth and good governance in comparison with non-resource-rich 
countries (Sachs and Warner 2006). This can be due to the nature of the natural 
resource sector being detached from political and economic processes and the risk of 
rent-seeking by both government officials and corporations (Humphreys et al. 2007). 
Hence, the resource curse does not necessarily refer to countries being cursed as a 
result of their resources, but cursed as a result of the leadership (Duruigbo 2005). The 
following sections will explore the role of institutions and mining corporations that is 
often referred to in the broader resource curse scholarship. 
 
 
4.1.2 The Role of Institutions 
 
According to Sarr and Swanson (2012), ‘poor institutional quality is one of the main 
drivers of economic underdevelopment, particularly in resource-rich economies.’ In 
explaining the resource curse theory and the role of institutions, scholars such as Auty 
and Gelb (2001) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2002) have divided 
countries/institutions into two categories - benevolent/producer friendly and 
predatory/grabber friendly. Resource-rich countries that have remained poor despite 
their high resource endowment have commonly been found to be predatory/grabber 
friendly in nature and have been less inclined to align their interests with the majority. 
Rather, ‘revenue from resource rents have been diverted to the powerful elite, leading 
to relaxed market constrains and misallocated resources’ (Auty and Gelb 2001).  
 
A favorite case in the resource curse scholarship is the experience of Nigeria, Africa’s 
largest exporter of oil. Estimates of Nigeria’s revenue from its crude oil exports 
between 1970 and 1999 indicate that the country earned up to $320 billion, an amount 
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that could certainly help with poverty alleviation. However, studies show that poverty 
increased from twenty-eight percent of the population in 1980, to forty-six percent in 
1985, to sixty-six percent in 1996 (Duruigbo 2005). As a result of Nigeria’s ‘weak 
rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy and high levels of corruption’ (Mehlum et al. 
2002), the trickling-down of resource wealth was blocked from reaching its citizens.   
 
The argument on the ‘role of institutions’ in relation to a resource curse is further 
strengthened when exploring the case of Botswana, ranked as the least corrupt 
African country by the Groningen Corruption Perception Index (Mehlum et al. 2002). 
As described by Gwebu (2012), Botswana took on the role as a developmental state 
and successfully used their mineral revenue to foster development through ‘shaping 
mining policies that supported infrastructural and service development and poverty 
reduction.’ Furthermore, Botswana’s honest bureaucracy and prudent economic 
management also helped the country in creating an equally beneficial extractive 
industry and helped attract foreign investment into the country (ibid).  
 
 
4.1.3 The Role of MNCs 
 
In addition to the state, multinational corporations are the major actors in extractive 
industries and have been found to contribute to symptoms of a resource curse. The 
impact of corporate actors go “beyond providing revenue and employment and 
maximizing profits and hence increasing shareholders value, that they have power and 
influence (actual and potential) beyond their formal location within legal and political 
structures, particularly those of developing countries and that they should be 
recognized as conscious and influential participants in activities with a broad range of 
consequences” (UNECA and AU 2010 cited by Campbell 2012). In spite of the 
positive influence that corporate actors can have in extractive industries in the Global 
South, scholars have suggested that they often focus more on profit-maximization at 
the expense of other, more vulnerable actors such as governments who lack 
knowledge in mineral extraction (Hilson 2012; Humphreys et al. 2007; Slack 2005). 
According to Humphreys et al. (2007), as firms have more expertise in the extractives 
industry and are more familiar with the value of the natural resources, they often get 
the better end of the deal. 
 
In terms of contributing to a resource curse, it has also been found that weak states 
attract extractive corporations due to the opportunities of engaging in corrupt 
activities. For example, ‘international mining companies that seek to maximize their 
income can do so by obtaining natural resources at below market value through 
bribing government officials, rather than figuring out how to extract the resources 
more efficiently (Humphreys et al. 2007). Essentially, mineral revenue is misallocated 
and is only benefitting corrupt mining companies and government officials, rather 
than the majority. 
 
Furthermore, conducting business with weak states also eases the pressure for mining 
companies to adhere to their CSR policies. Government oversight of extractive 
industries operations have been found to be weak or nonexistent and has therefore 
hindered corporate commitments to CSR and respect of environmental and human 
rights standards (Slack 2005). 
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5 Empirical Material and Analysis 
 
In order to understand Malawi’s micro level resource curse, its important to begin the 
analysis with an understanding of the resource curse in its national context, as this is 
where many of the local issues stem from. The following sections will provide 
information acquired from the interviews and reports by informants that discuss the 
current ‘mining climate’ in Malawi. The focus of this section will be on Malawi’s 
institutions, mining governance, and mining corporations. 
 
5.1 The Resource Curse on a Macro Level 
Malawi is a democratic, multi-party government that is currently under the leadership 
of Peter Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party following his election 
(albeit believed to be rigged) in May 2014, the same year marking Malawi’s 50th 
anniversary of independence. Malawi can be classified as a ‘predatory’ or ‘grabber 
friendly’ state and corruption remains endemic in the country. The ‘Capital Hill 
Cashgate Scandal’ is demonstrative of this claim and it is the largest money-
laundering scandal in all of Malawian history. It is estimated that Joyce Banda, 
Malawi’s then president, and her cronies obtained millions of dollars during her two 
years of office. 
Malawi has an agro-based economy, with tobacco being its largest export crop. Due 
to the worldwide anti-smoking campaign, tobacco sales have waned in the country, 
calling for the need to venture out into other sectors of the economy. To express their 
commitment to economic growth, Malawi’s government has named mining a priority 
sector in the Growth and Development Strategy II 2012-2016 and the Economic 
Recovery Plan. It has been estimated that mining can contribute up to 20% of GDP by 
2016, yet these figures are believed to have the potential of reaching double if the 
sector is managed efficiently (Interview 3). The available and recognized mineral 
resources in Malawi are uranium, heavy mineral sands, strontianite, rare earth 
minerals, phosphate, bauxite, gypsum, vermiculite, precious and semi-precious 
stones, limestone, dimension stone, silica sand, sulphides and coal (NCA, CCJP 
2013). Currently, there are over twenty mining companies engaged in mineral 
exploration with exclusive prospecting licenses or mining licenses in Malawi.  
 
5.1.1 Malawi’s Mining Legislation 
The main body of legislation that covers mining in Malawi is the Mines and Minerals 
Act (MMA) of 1981 (Interview 2). The law was created during Malawi’s one-party 
rule, known as the ‘Banda Era1,’ and gives a significant amount of power and 
ownership of minerals to the President and the Minister without any checks and 
balances such as a mining advisory board (NCA, CCJP 2013). This can be due to the 
patrimonial politics that emerged in Malawi (and many other Sub-Saharan countries) 
following its independence from colonial rule. The huge discretionary power of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kamuzu Banda is Malawi’s first president following the country’s independence from Britain in 
1964.  
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President and the Minister of Mines on the ownership of Malawi’s minerals and 
natural resources is inconsistent with the country’s current democratic dispensation. It 
conflicts with the Malawian Constitution, which vests the ownership of natural 
resources to the country of Malawi, rather than its leader (ibid). With the sole 
jurisdiction of the Minister of Mines to: appoint the Commissioner of Mines and 
Minerals; enter into agreements with prospective mining investors on behalf of 
Malawi; and grant, limit, amend or cancel mining licenses (CCJP 2014), it appears to 
harness an environment in which corruption could easily thrive. Simply put by 
political analyst, Jimmy Kainja, ‘It takes only one person to corrupt in order to 
corrupt the entire sector’ (Interview 5).  
In addition to the huge discretionary power vested in the Presidency and Minister of 
Mines, other weaknesses as a result of the outdated and patrimonial-nature of 
Malawi’s mining legislation includes the inconsistent and arbitrary deals between 
mining investors and government. ‘Many of the key terms under which a company 
operates in Malawi are determined by bilateral negotiations rather than consistent 
application of the law’ (NCA, CCJP 2013). In other words, agreements between 
government and mining firms are on an individual, rather than a standardized basis. 
This gives more freedom for mining corporations to negotiate in their favor in a ‘race 
to the bottom’ in terms of what they provide Malawi in return. This includes 
provisions for the company to source a proportion of their supplies from Malawi; the 
recruiting and training of Malawian citizens for mining operations; and ensuring that 
communities in mining areas will financially benefit from mining revenues. 
Furthermore, all of the agreements between mining firms and government are kept 
private from the public and mining contracts are sealed with non-disclosure 
agreements (NCA, CCJP 2013).  
With regards to Malawi’s bouts and histories of corruption; the patrimonial nature of 
the mining legislation; the inconsistent application of the law; and the lack of 
transparency of mining agreements; I believe that together, these factors combined are 
a recipe for a resource curse. Due to problems of transparency on Malawi’s total 
revenues from mining, it is difficult to determine exactly how much the government 
has profited and how much has been lost. However, focusing on Malawi’s tax regime 
on its mining sector, studies have estimated that Malawi has ‘lost more than $217 
million between 2008 and 2012’ (NCA, CCJP 2013) due to various tax incentives and 
concessions offered to mining investors. In a review of Malawi’s mining sector, the 
World Bank (2009) specifically warned about a possible resource curse stemming 
from inappropriate safeguards of substantial tax leakage (cited in NCA, CCJP 2013). 
This was believed to ‘contribute to reducing the value of mineral resources to Malawi, 
undermine the integrity of the fiscal regime, and breed mistrust and opposition to 
mining’ (ibid). These 2009 predictions by the World Bank appear to be already taking 
place in Malawi and will be identified throughout this paper.   
 
5.1.2 MNCs in Malawi and the Resource Curse 
Drawing from the resource curse theory, one of the main problems supporting that 
natural resources have a dismal track record in terms of being a ‘tool for 
development’ is that countries do not get the full worth of their natural resources. This 
is especially true for countries such as Malawi due to its relatively infant mining 
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sector and the lack of expertise in mineral extraction. This section will discuss the 
presence of the Australian multinational corporation, Paladin, in Malawi and how 
they are contributing to a resource curse on a national scale. 
The opportunities to maximize benefits are readily there when conducting business 
with a less knowledgeable counterpart. The mining agreement between Paladin and 
the Malawian government is representative of this claim and has sparked much 
controversy from CSOs in Malawi. In exchange for their tax cuts and other 
concessions, Paladin granted government a fifteen percent share in their Kayelekera 
uranium mine, which was estimated by Paladin to provide the country with dividends 
of between $3 and 10 million a year once the mine becomes profitable (NCA, CCJP 
2013). This means that during the timeframe of when the mine becomes ‘profitable’ 
(which it may never), Paladin is still earning millions of dollars whilst paying 
extremely low taxes. Internal figures estimate the company paid $1.6 million in taxes 
on exports worth $127 million (ibid).  
Furthermore, there appears to be a significant amount of discrepancies in regards to 
payment for royalties, taxes, and purchases from Malawian businesses that have been 
obtained from Paladin and the figures listed on Paladin’s public reports. Figures from 
Paladin indicate that the company paid $2.58 million - a rate of .87 percent - in 
royalty payments between 2009 and 2012; however, Paladin’s public reporting states 
they paid 1.5 percent (NCA,CCJP 2013). A similar discrepancy is identified on the 
report by Paladin on their exports and imports of uranium. On Paladin’s website, they 
claim to sell uranium to ‘major utilities and other entities located mainly in the USA, 
Australia, China, Taiwan and UK,’ however, according to UN Comtrade’s2 records, 
all the uranium exports are going to Canada or Namibia, also where Paladin operates 
their subsidiary companies (NCA, CCJP 2013). While it hasn’t been proven, it can be 
hypothesized that Paladin is selling the uranium to their subsidiary companies at 
below market value, thus ‘cheating the system’ and holding back potential revenue for 
Malawi. 
While there is always a possibility for MNCs to conduct business in an ‘unethical’ 
manner due to the absence of regulation for MNCs in international law, the effect that 
this poses for Malawi are particularly detrimental due to the quality of Malawi’s 
institutions. Furthermore, while it is not the role of MNCs such as Paladin to take over 
the state’s duty in achieving development goals, it appears that they are in fact 
perpetuating the deep-rooted structural problems that already exist in Malawi such as 
lack of transparency and accountability in government. Without addressing these 
issues, Malawi’s prospects of surviving a resource curse appear feeble.  
Evidence of a resource curse is more prevalent on a local scale, as it is where mining 
has had its largest and most immediate impact. Furthermore, due to mining in Malawi 
being relatively new and the low levels of transparency, it is difficult to determine 
exactly how the country is being affected by mining on a national scale (Interview 4). 
Nonetheless, many of the challenges that have been discussed in previous sections 
closely relate to the local resource curse in mining communities, especially in 
Karonga where Malawi’s largest mine (Kayelekera) is located. Exploring beyond 
national and economic indicators of a resource curse, the following sections will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 UN Comtrade is a repository of official trade statistics and relevant analytical tables 	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answer: 
 What are the effects of a resource curse on Malawi’s local communities? 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 The Resource Curse on a Micro Level 
In response to the adverse effects of mining and as a result of weak accountability and 
transparency by government and mining investors, civil society has played an active 
role in Malawi’s mining sector. Some CSO staff have expressed their disagreement 
with mining taking place in Malawi at all. According to Reinford Mwangonde from 
CFJ, 
 “Malawi is simply just not ready for mining. However, we can’t stop it so we 
 must influence it wherever possible and advocate for community benefits”  
  
The advocacy work of CSOs such as CCJP, CFJ and NCA assisted me in identifying 
some of the most pressing challenges associated with Malawi’s mining sector from a 
development perspective and I was able to identify the impacts of a resource curse on 
a local community level. Interviews with various CSOs provided information on the 
repercussions of Malawi’s mining sector by outlining their intervention projects, 
Tonse Tipindule and TIWONE II, and the ways in which these projects advocate for a 
more transparent, accountable, inclusive and responsible extractive industry in 
Malawi.  
‘Tonse Tipindule’ translates to ‘each one of us should benefit’ and the project is 
intended to promote inclusion, accountability and responsiveness in Malawi’s mining 
sector (Interview 3). These goals are strived for through the promotion of engagement 
of civil society, mining investors and governments; increased citizen participation; 
and community empowerment. Through the Tonse Tipindule project, communities 
that surround the mining areas in Karonga have been educated and informed on the 
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effects of mining, the policies that govern it, and the concept of CSR. ‘This measure 
is not to only help community members, but to give them the tools to help themselves 
through holding government and mining investors accountable’ (Interview 3).  
Similar to the Tonse Tipindule project, the TIWONE II project’s aim is to promote 
engagement of all stakeholders in Malawi’s mining sector, however, its main foci are 
compensation and relocation of communities that have been displaced or forced to 
resettle. According to Success Sikwese of CCJP (Interview  1),  
 “There are no proper guidelines to guide how people should be resettled and  
 as a result, people end up in places they can’t access water or basic services 
 such as schools and hospitals.’ The project advocates for a resettlement plan 
 specifically tailored to the extractives sector; and that in the event of 
 resettlement, the livelihoods of communities are not compromised”  
Many of these challenges revealed by CSOs were observed first-hand during my 
engagement with communities in Karonga whom reside around the Mwabulambo 
coal mine and the Kayelekera uranium mine, and I was provided an insight into how 
mining has contributed to a resource curse at a micro level. The key themes that will 
be discussed in the following sections include mining-induced displacement and 
resettlement; livelihood effects of mining; corruption and conflict; and mining and the 
environment.  
 
5.2.1 Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement 
 
Displacement and resettlement in Malawi has led to a number of social and economic 
disruptions amongst local community members that reside around mining sites. 
Previous studies (CCJP 2014) on Malawian mining communities by CSOs have 
indicated that social disruptions include host-community hostility, in which resettled 
communities face marginalization or opposition as a result of being ‘outsiders’ in 
their new location. Often times there are also differences in kinship structures of 
communities. For example, social disruptions can occur as a result of relocation when 
patrilineal populations are combined with matrilineal. In regards to economic 
disturbances, single women have been found to be most vulnerable as they usually 
rely on male in-laws for help with labor (CCJP 2014). Furthermore, the overall loss of 
income by resettled communities also translates to increased rates of children 
dropping out of school. 
 
The findings during my fieldwork research in the rural area of Karonga coincided 
with the aforementioned studies piloted by CSOs. The focus group interview in which 
I conducted near the Mwabulambo coal mine provided detailed accounts of the 
hardships endured by community members following the resettlement from their 
lands. They claimed that they, and most of their neighbors, had a positive initial 
reaction when learning about potential mining activity in their area.  
 
 “We were told there would be employment for us, that new clinics and schools 
 would be built and that we would have portable water and electricity… But 
 these promises have yet to be fulfilled”  
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It appears that mining companies have made promises in order to gain the initial 
‘social license to operate’; however, they have failed to deliver on these promises of 
development. Furthermore, community members were let down during the 
compensation process of their land. Compensation was described to be insufficient, as 
many were paid a random price at the discretion of the evaluator rather than from a 
set formula or policy. One man described his inability to pay school fees for his 
children due to the inadequate payment for his land and the loss of income after losing 
his crops. When asked what he thought would be a better resettlement plan, he 
claimed,  
 
 “A standard house and a startup package. Without these, its difficult for us to 
 rebuild the lives we once had.”  
 
While mining activity was perceived to have positive developmental effects on local 
villages such as employment and new infrastructure, my interviews with community 
members indicate a paradoxical effect. In addition to promises by mining investors 
not being fulfilled, the livelihoods of community members have not been restored.  
These adverse effects are not limited to the result of mining-induced displacement and 
resettlement. The next section will discuss the general effects that mining has had on 
communities that have not had to resettle.  
 
 
5.2.2 Livelihood Effects of Mining  
 
During my trip to Karonga, I visited the Kayelekera uranium mine to meet and 
discuss with community members about how mining has affected their livelihoods. 
23-year-old Towera Mtambo (Interview 9) gave me her account of how uranium 
mining has affected her household. Prior to mining activity, Mtambo’s father earned 
an income through farming, however due to poverty, he was eager to earn extra 
income to support his family. He was employed part-time by Paladin and worked with 
processing the uranium. Mtambo claims that her father’s health began to deteriorate 
after a couple years of being employed and until now, he suffers from chest pains and 
chronic coughing3. Mtambo claims, 
 “Before mining my father was strong and a hardworking farmer. After mining, 
 my father is ill and sickly and doesn’t have the strength to work on the farm 
 anymore ” 
The Kayelekera mine has been closed for maintenance since February 2014 and 
Mtambo’s father has been unable to voice his health concerns to Paladin, as they are 
inaccessible due to their restrictive security measures. The livelihood of Mtambo and 
her family have deteriorated since the uranium mining commenced. Her father is 
unable to return to farming due to his acquired illness and the family can no longer 
afford to employ part-time farming labor.  
Maskin Tuta Gondwe, 31, (Interview 10) also gave me his account of how mining has 
affected his livelihood. Similar to Mtambo’s father, Gondwe was employed by 
Paladin and worked as a driver and a pit-surveyor between 2004 and 2010. He claims 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The most common illness associated with uranium mining is lung cancer. The symptoms that 
Mtambo claims her father has appear to correspond with lung cancer. 
	  	   17	  
that 3 years after working at the uranium mine, he started developing chest pains and 
a chronic cough, similar to the symptoms of Mtambo’s father. In order to treat his 
illness, the doctor at Paladin’s clinic gave Gondwe regular, non-prescribed painkillers. 
Louis Nkhata, my translator and also a member of a CSO that works closely with 
mining communities, provided information as to how Paladin handles radioactive 
healthcare: 
 “Government had a deal with Paladin to train radioactive specialists. The 
 government specifically gave Paladin two doctors that they could send abroad 
 to obtain the necessary radioactive training in order to work at the Kayelekera 
 clinic. However, once the doctors had been trained, they decided to remain in 
 the bigger cities for better wages, rather than staying in Karonga. The 
 current doctor has no knowledge on radioactive healthcare” (Interview 7) 
In addition to treating mining-related illnesses, Paladin was supposed to continuously 
monitor the urine of their employees. It is claimed that Paladin used to monitor urine 
but has since stopped. As the reasons of this are unknown, it could be due to the cost 
and time of continuously having to monitor all of the employees.  
In contributing to a resource curse on a local scale, it appears that Paladin has only 
been concerned with obtaining cheap labor for their uranium mining at the expense of 
the wellbeing of communities and their employees. Furthermore, government has 
been indolent in terms of protecting their citizens and holding Paladin accountable. 
Government and Paladin could have done more to keep the radioactive specialists in 
Karonga, rather than turning a blind-eye as the specialists remained in the cities. 
Furthermore, Paladin could have continued with the monitoring of urine of their 
employees to prevent illness and disease. As a result lack of accountability and 
responsibility of government and Paladin, it appears that human capital is the expense 
of mining in Karonga, and has thus contributed to a local resource curse. 
 
5.2.3 Corruption and Conflict 
The increase of mining activity in Karonga has also bred corruption between mining 
investors and the local authorities, such as the Karonga chiefs. According to Sydney 
Mwakaswaya (Interview 6) of CCJP, the local authorities, also employed by the 
Malawian government, have previously been bribed by mining companies in order to 
silence the concerns of community members and keep the peace. The Senior Chief of 
Karonga obtained expensive gifts from Paladin, such as a new automobile and a 
house. Despite conducting the interview outside the Chief’s acquired house, 
understandably, it was difficult to obtain information from him directly about his 
corrupt engagement with the mining company. Nonetheless, he did claim that his 
relationship with Paladin has ‘since deteriorated’ (Interview 11), indicating that 
perhaps they do not have the same close relationship as before and the Chief has now 
sided with the communities. Notwithstanding, it does appear that corruption persists 
and mining investors are now bribing the village headmen instead. The local CCJP 
diocese offices in Karonga open their doors to community members every week in 
order to provide a forum to voice mining-related concerns, which are then forwarded 
to government. According to Mwakaswaya, 
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 “What we have noticed now is that members of communities have started 
 coming to represent themselves, rather than the village headmen that are 
 supposed to be the ‘voice’ of the communities. Community members have 
 complained that the village headmen prefer to side with the mining 
 companies” (Interview 6) 
 
It is claimed that traditional authorities have been used as puppets by mining 
investors, which has sparked much criticism from communities, and in some cases, 
even conflict. The July 2011 poor governance themed demonstrations across Malawi 
led to the arson of Senior Chief of Karonga’s car. ‘Community members were simply 
fed up with being controlled and silenced by the Chief, especially after witnessing the 
extravagant contributions he received from Paladin’ (Interview 6).  
 
Other conflicts that have occurred have directly involved mining companies. 
Demonstrations have been held when mining corporations have not upheld their 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) after signing an agreement with mining 
communities. Prior to commencing their mining operations, Eland Coal Mine 
Company (ECM) promised to construct new schools, hospitals, and amenities such as 
electricity and running water. However, after beginning mineral extraction, ECM 
claimed that they first needed to make profit (Interview 8). Several years have gone 
by with no construction taking place and little feedback from the mining company. 
The informants claim that every time an attempt is made to set up a meeting with 
mining officials, they are turned away due to the ECM manager being abroad (ibid). 
This has led to numerous protests by communities who are tired of waiting for their 
MoU agreements to be upheld. 
 
The actions of mining corporations and corrupt civil servants have contributed to a 
local resource curse in Malawi. Mining companies such as Paladin have influenced 
the spread of corruption in Karonga and have not only ignored local communities, but 
have caused the local leaders to ignore them as well. Furthermore, MoU agreements 
by mining companies have not been transparent in terms of specifying when they 
intend to fulfill their pacts with communities. This, along with corruption, has sparked 
conflict in the mining communities. These clashes are expected to continue if the 
concerns and interests of communities are consistently ignored. 
 
 
5.2.4 Mining and the Environment 
 
The issue of radioactive waste has been on the radar since the beginning of mining 
activity in Karonga. Mining companies have offered little information, especially 
Paladin, in regards to the environmental cost of uranium mining and the ways in 
which they intend to handle it. CSOs have stated that they have waited two years for 
Paladin to provide comprehensive reports to determine whether underground water 
has been contaminated due to leakages from the mine. However, Paladin continues to 
hold that it is the government’s responsibility to release information, and has shown 
little concern for being held accountable to local mining communities.  
 
As previously stated, mining in Malawi is relatively new; consequently, there is an 
absence of professional expertise in the sector to conduct monitoring of the 
radiological impact of uranium mining. In the event that Paladin does systematically 
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provide comprehensive reports on their monitoring of the mine, there still lacks a 
secondary monitor, such as government, to assure that Paladin’s findings are correct 
and that they are successfully treating water that is contaminated.  
 
While conducting research in Karonga, I attended a meeting (Meeting 2) in which 
Bruno Chareyron, a nuclear physics engineer from France, was invited to conduct 
tests at Kayelekera and speak with community members about the health hazards 
associated with uranium and his findings from the samples collected at the mine. 
Community members were eager to have some answers as to why dead fish were 
washing ashore and whether it had anything to do with the contamination of rivers 
and the lake as a result of uranium mining. As it was not possible to test the dead fish 
due to the lack of proper lab equipment in Malawi, Chareyron was unable to 
determine the exact cause of death of the fish. However, it was assessed that 
contamination of water supplies could be very possible as Paladin has failed to cover 
their radioactive ‘waste rock’ dump at the mining site. Without covering the waste 
rock with at least one meter of soil, the chances of radioactive dust, radon and gamma 
radiation emission are significantly higher as it can be transferred through air and can 
be spread as a result of rainfall. Furthermore, the leakage of tailings4 from uranium 
mining has a large impact on the environment. According to Chareyron,  
 
 “No country has a permanent solution for the disposal of tailings. In France, 
 we have had spillages on the road, which have spread from rainfall. It has 
 even infiltrated in the infrastructure, with acid destroying the paper on walls in 
 peoples’ homes. A woman sent a sample of her wallpaper to determine the 
 amount of radiation. The results were very negative”   
 
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study in 2006 reported Paladin as stating 
that the Kayelekera tailing dam was very safe and that the design is good enough to 
resist seismic and high rainfall (NCA, CCJP 2013). They committed to creating an 
emergency plan in case the tailing dam would collapse. When Chareyron visited the 
Kayelekera mine (a day before the Karonga meeting) and asked Paladin for a copy of 
their emergency plan, they stated that no such plans exist. Furthermore, Paladin was 
also asked whether they had a draft of the mining closure plan for when they intend to 
shut down their mining project in Karonga. Explained by Chareyron, 
 
 “We asked, ‘How long will you have to collect the water in those dams and 
 how long can you treat that water? Who will pay for that?’ They couldn’t 
 provide any answers to our questions”  
 
What was gathered from this meeting in Karonga and the account provided by 
Chareyron about his visit to the Kayelekera mine and his engagement with Paladin is 
the overall lack of transparency and accountability on behalf of Paladin and their 
mining operations. The people of Malawi are kept in the dark as to how their 
environment is being affected and how Paladin is currently monitoring the mine; what 
their emergency plan is in case the tailing dam were to collapse; and how they intend 
to rehabilitate the mining area once mining activity has ended. Also, they have failed 
to cover their waste rock, which can further contaminate the surrounding areas. If in 
the event that rivers and Lake Malawi were to be contaminated due to toxic waste, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tailings: waste produced from mining. In this case, radioactive mud waiting for final disposal. 
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would have dire consequences for Malawians as many rely on fishing as a source of 
their livelihood. Furthermore, without the consistent monitoring and controlling of 
radiation on the land, communities that live around the mine are also at risk of 
developing illnesses such as lung cancer. If Paladin isn’t showing any concern for 
their own employees, what are the chances they will care for other members of the 
communities? And what about the environment? 
 
 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore beyond the orthodox resource curse thesis by 
placing the concept of a resource curse within a local context. While the resource 
curse theory generally focuses on economic indicators and the negative impact of 
mining on a national scale, this study has focused on the resource curse’s most 
immediate effects in the villages surrounding the mines. Furthermore, it has 
incorporated social and environmental indicators, rather than purely economical. 
 
In order to carry out the research, I conducted a qualitative field study in Malawi and 
based the majority of my findings on interviews with civil society. Various CSOs in 
Lilongwe and Karonga assisted me in the initial stages of identifying the challenges 
associated with mining on a local scale. Thereafter, my visits to the Kayelekera 
uranium mine and the Mwabulambo coal mine in Karonga put much of the acquired 
information into perspective. I was able to meet with members of affected 
communities in person and learn about their struggles and the ways in which mining 
has affected their livelihoods. What was gathered is that, indeed, Malawi’s resource 
curse is evident on a micro level in the mining villages. Community members have 
not had their livelihoods restored as a result of resettlement due to inadequate 
payments of land and crops, and as a result of the lack of policies to guide and 
evaluate the compensation process. Furthermore, mining investors have expressed 
their initial ‘social license to operate’ by promising new infrastructure and amenities 
in attempts to gain the support of communities. However, many of these promises 
remain unfulfilled and there is a growing resentment brewing amongst community 
members against mining firms. 
 
Another indicator of a local resource curse stems from the neglect of mining 
companies and government in protecting members of the mining communities, 
particularly workers of the mine. Workers are reported to be suffering from chronic 
coughing and chest pains as a result of working close with uranium and have received 
either some [inadequate] healthcare, or none at all. As a result of their illness, many 
cannot return to their other modes of work, such as farming, and are thus unable to 
earn an income. Additionally, mining companies have also been negligent in 
responding to the needs and concerns of communities. Rather, they have been 
engaging in corrupt deals with traditional authorities in order to control the 
communities and keep them silent. While mining companies have turned their backs 
on these communities, they have also caused some of their local leaders to abandon 
them. This has created conflict and in response, communities have protested and held 
demonstrations against local authorities and mining firms. 
 
Furthermore, the commencement of mining activity in Karonga has not been limited 
to the social impacts on mining communities. It also appears that mining companies 
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have been careless of environmental concerns and have failed to provide plans on 
how they plan to restore the land that they have exploited, and any emergency-action 
plans in the event of the spillage of tailings. If the toxic waste were to contaminate 
surrounding rivers and Lake Malawi, the consequences would be dismal as many rely 
on fish as a source of their livelihood. As these companies are showing little concern 
for communities despite the clashes that have taken place, the chances of them 
responding to the adverse environmental effects of mining appear grim. 
 
To conclude, it appears that Malawi is in dire need to strengthen their institutions and 
hold mining companies accountable in order to turn the notion of the ‘resource curse’ 
into a ‘resource blessing.’ Despite these mining companies being predominantly 
Western, they appear to be unfamiliar with the concept of CSR and far away from 
achieving a ‘social license to operate.’ Rather, it appears that Malawi’s lack of 
mineral extraction expertise and weak government capacity is working in their favor. 
While it is difficult to see how the adverse effects associated with mining are 
impacting Malawi on a national level, the evidence lies in Malawi’s local mining 
communities. I am hopeful that this research has proven the importance of studying 
the resource curse at a micro level; and that it can contribute to the creation of more 
socially and environmentally responsible policies in relation to natural resource 
extraction. Further research is encouraged.  	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